Rowe: Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act by Hally, John R
Boston College Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 2 Article 34
1-1-1963
Rowe: Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-
Patman Act
John R. Hally
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John R. Hally, Rowe: Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 4 B.C.L. Rev. 478 (1963),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol4/iss2/34
BOOK REVIEWS
"Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act." By
Frederick M. Rowe:' Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1962, The Trade Regu-
lation Series, pp. xxx, 675. $22.50.
By a margin of one year, the publication of this volume missed the
twenty-fifth birthday of the Robinson-Patman Act (1961). However, it
would not have constituted an appropriate silver anniversary present
for either the original promoters or the subsequent enforcers of the legis-
lation, for the author combines a valuable legal text with searching and
almost unvaryingly critical commentary on the objectives and techniques
of Mr. Patman (and his allies of twenty-five years ago) and the Federal
Trade Commission.
That the bar has long needed a work of the instant sort requires no
extended demonstration in view of the fact that it is the only treatment
of the Robinson-Patman Act, of comparable scope and depth, which has
become available since the enactment of the legislation. The numerous law
review articles treating separate phases of the field to one side, the subject
has heretofore been dealt with as a whole only in a pamphlet work of
under 200 pages. 2
The present text is one of a so-called "trade regulation series" which
in the words of its editor seeks to "present the law with the greatest possible
clarification as a guide for the general practitioner who has little experience
in this field . . . and for the specialist who desires a ready reference tool."
(p. viii.) The problems posed by these not entirely compatible dual ob-
jectives, accentuated as they are by this most confusing of all laws in a field
noted for its generality and uncertainty, have been successfully surmounted
by Mr. Rowe. Of all the texts in this series to date,3 his promises to be the
most universally valuable.
The scheme of presentation of the material follows more or less directly
the order of the statute itself. After an opening chapter on the general
legislative history, the author briefly outlines some of the economic and
marketing realities in and to which the oft-times ambiguous provisions of
the act must be applied by the courts and the FTC. Analysis of the first
section of the act (the section 2(a) price discrimination provision) com-
mences with a study of the jurisdictional requirements (i.e., the necessity
for the challenged transaction to involve a sale of "commodities," of "like
grade and quality" "in interstate commerce"). Succeeding chapters consider
the factors entering into a determination of what constitutes a "price"
discrimination and deal with the necessity for proof of an injury to compe-
1 Member of the District of Columbia Bar and of the firm of Kirkland, Ellis,
Hodson, Chaffetz & Masters.
2 Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems Under the Robinson-Patman
Act, Committee on Continuing Legal Education (ALI) (1952, rev. eds. 1953, 1959).
A Lamb & Kittelle, Trade Association Law and Practice (1956); Fugate, Foreign
Commerce and the Antitrust Laws (1958) ; Hale, Market Power: Size and Shape Under
the Sherman Act (1958); Fulda, Competition in the Regulated Industries, Transporta-
tion (1961),
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titian, either on the seller level (the so-called "primary line" injury) or on
the buyer level (the "secondary line"). The "meeting competition" and
"cost justification" defenses are then analyzed. The illegal brokerage (section
2(c)), the advertising payments and services sections (sections 2(d) and
(e)), the buyer liability provision (section 2(f)) and the provision for
criminal responsibility (section 3) are treated in detail and in that order.
In view of the express objective of the trade regulation series to serve
the general practitioner who has little experience in the field, a cautionary
observation may be in order. The section-by-section treatment of the act
means that, unlike a text on landlord and tenant, for example, resort to a
particular chapter or section of the book will not necessarily produce a
helpful or complete answer. Thus, a problem involving different prices
by a seller to customers might well involve, among other things, questions
of whether the sales were in commerce (Chapter 4), whether there was
injury to competition on the seller or buyer level (Chapters 5-8), the
availability of a meeting competition defense (Chapter 9) or even whether
a person who is a customer of the buyer or competitor of the seller has
standing to bring a treble damage action (Chapter 16).
The particular merit of the work derives, in addition to the thoroughness
of its treatment of the issues and collection of the relevant case law, from the
statutory history-and-purpose-centered approach to each provision of the act.
Rejecting any attempt at merely summarizing the purport of the existing
decisions, as productive of a misleading impression of a nonexistent certainty,
the author commences the discussion of each section of the act with a
detailed review of the legislative history of the particular provision. When,
as is frequently true, the subsequent exposition reveals still undefined areas
of the law, the reader is better equipped to form his own judgment on the
intelligible and defensible possible interpretations.
This completeness of the references to the statutory history' produces
one of the most valuable incidental benefits of the text, particularly to the
antitrust specialist: in dealing with statutory history hereafter reference to
and citation of this text should eliminate the need for resort to the Con-
gressional materials which often are not readily available.
It is noteworthy that the presentation of this complete legislative
background in one place demonstrates, as its partial quotation in the cases
has never done, how much the source and purpose of this legislation was anti-
competitive in import. Although helping the "little businessman" against the
"big chains" may have inspired its sponsors, it is clear that they sought in
the Robinson-Patman Act (unlike the Sherman and Clayton Acts) to
accomplish such a result in a number of respects by restricting rather than
fostering the competitive process.
So far as the author's handling of the case law (both court and FTC
decisions) is concerned, the work seems to be extremely complete and ac-
curate, thereby fulfilling the objective of providing the antitrust practi-
4 The volume contains, in addition to a general summary of legislative history
(Chapter 1), a detailed analysis of the history of each section (in the relevant chapters)
and an appendix which sets out some seven bills which culminated in the Robinson-
Patman Act, two relevant Senate Judiciary Committee reports and the Conference Com-
mittee report.
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tioner with a ready reference tools The provision for a pocket part promises
that the utility of the volume in this respect will be maintained in the future.
By virtue of the uniqueness and competence of his book, which has been
noted above, the author's views on the as yet unresolved areas of the law
are bound to have significant weight in future decisions of the courts,
if not of the Commission. The viewpoint of the author (an attorney repre-
senting respondents° and one believing that the act, in its original conception
and subsequent application, has more often than not been anti-competitive
in effect (Chapter 17)) is neither concealed nor a bar to reasoned ap-
praisals.
With respect to certain interesting questions, which either have been or
currently are the subject of judicial consideration, the author endorses the
decisions of the courts of appeal reversing Commission opinions holding (1)
that the meeting competition defense, although available under section 2(e)
(furnishing of promotional services) provision, is not available under the
conceptually identical section 2(d) (p. 554 n.80) ; (2) that the defense is
unavailable in cases involving the "obtaining" of new customers as distinct
from "retaining" old customers (p. 419) and (3) that the benefits of
section 2(b) cannot be claimed by a gasoline distributor with respect to
reductions to his retailer made to enable the latter to meet lower prices
accorded by a competitive distributor to the latter's retailer (pp. 240, 247). 7
In other areas the author has some interesting suggestions. He defends
the granting of discounts to co-operative buying organizations representing
a number of independent small retailers, at least where the co-operative
furnishes genuine wholesaling services such as warehousing or delivery.
Viewing the Commission's denial of any group buying advantages in such
cases as tending to decrease rather than increase competition by depriving
their members of the advantages of size which the large chain organization
can secure without running afoul of the act,8 he calls for a sympathetic
judicial refurbishing of section 4 of the act originally intended as an exemp-
tion for such organizations.
On the troublesome problem of a manufacturer's lower price for private
brand goods produced for a large retail organization as compared with the
5 So far as those cases with which the reviewer is personally familiar, he can
furnish witness that they are all cited and attributed exactly to the propositions for
which they stand, a report which cannot always be made by a reviewer.
e E.g., p. 322, discussing the defense of the proviso permitting sales at differential
prices when due to changing conditions affecting product markets or marketability:
". . . [T]he full potentiality of this proviso . . . as a defense to price discrimination
charges. . . ."
7 The related difficult problem presented by the distributors' efforts to limit the
area of the price-cutting with a resultant possible effect on dealers in the immediately
adjacent area is not commented on. See American Oil Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 1 15,961
(Dkt, 8183 June 27, 1962). The problem is one which must be resolved on a case by
case basis in which, however, it is submitted that the guiding principle should be that the
courts will not substitute their judgment for what they find to be a bona fide reasonable
business judgment on the selection of the retailers to whom the lower price assistance
is given. Cf. U.S. v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Orbo Theatre v. Loew's
Inc., 156 F. Supp. 770, 778, aff'd per curiam, 261 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
8 See Commissioner Elman dissenting in Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc.,
3 Trade Reg. Rep. g 15,896 (Dkt. 7121 May 14, 1962).
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manufacturer's similar advertised and branded item (usually sold to the
smaller retailers), the writer makes one of his most original contributions; a
"commercial fungibility" standard is proposed, under which the two items
would be held to be of "like grade and quality" (and therefore present, all
other things being equal, an actionable discrimination) if the "business
community" would consider them to be substantially interchangeable at
the same price (p. 253).9
Again, with regard to the crucial inquiry in a section 2(a) price dis-
crimination case, whether the differential had any significant impact on
the vitality of competition (either on the seller or buyer level), the text
analyzes a series of factors which could, in appropriate cases, be resorted to
to demonstrate the lack of any such injury (p. 253)."
The discussion (Chapter 10) of the cost justification defense is particu-
larly complete. The legislative and case history, the summary of the various
areas where possible cost savings can be derived, and the accounting tech-
niques and problems involved in demonstrating a cost justification defense,
are fully spelled out. However, the writer reaches an essentially negative
conclusion as to the practical utility of the defense, not only for the reason
customarily assigned (i.e., Commission hostility)" but because of (I) the
unlikelihood, in the realities 'of modern marketing, that the quotation of the
particular challenged price was actually inspired by any considerations of
cost savings and (2) the inability of the accounting profession to furnish
objective and persuasive answers to the question, involved in most cost
justification situations, of allocating joint costs.
For this reviewer, one of the most interesting insights was noted in
connection with the discussion (Chapter 14) of the buyer liability provision
(section 2(f)) of the act. In a series of recent decisions, the Federal Trade
Commission, asserting that section 2(f) does not reach buyer inducement
of discriminatory advertising and promotional allowances, has, nevertheless,
held such buyer action unlawful under Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act 12
 (15 U.S.C. section 45(a)) as "unfair methods of
competition." (p. 432 et seq.) Although the particular cases involved rather
naked applications of large buyer power, for which little defense could be
made, the Commission's use of section 5 to attack such transactions, on
0
 The possible difficulty with this test is that it would legalize a situation where
the seller furnishes the large buyer a private brand at a price well below any advertising
values attributable to the branded item. The author recognizes this problem but feels
it would have to be accepted in the interests of a greater degree of competitive flexibility
(p. 76 n.136),
10 P. 186 et seq., listing as to secondary line injury: (1) intervening economic
factors dispelling the causal effect of the supplier's price differential on the customer
level; (2) offsetting costs neutralizing a customer's nominal price advantage; (3) com-
petitive inertia by customer as the real cause of injury; (4) availability of lower price
from other sources. As to similar factors precluding injury on the primary lines, see
p. 163, et seq. The text does not observe, as it might, the unlikelihood of any, much less
all, of these factors receiving any recognition whatsoever under the current tenor of FTC
decisions.
11 See Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws 172 (1955).
12 38 Stat. 719 (1925), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958).
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the sweeping rationale that the latter provision is available to bar anything
violative of the "spirit" (even though not the language) of the other
antitrust laws, has been criticized as a potentially dangerous expansion of
that section, the consequences of which can neither be foreseen nor adequately
limited by the courts." Mr. Rowe points out that this whole unwelcome
extension of section 5 coverage was unnecessary because the legislative
history and earlier decisions of the Commission indicate that section 2(f) was
intended to reach all forms of price discrimination under the Robinson-
Patman Act, including disproportionate promotional allowances. It seems
reasonable to conclude that had the Second Circuit been aware that the
Commission had available to it the more appropriate section 2(f) provision
through which to invalidate the buyer exactions involved in the Grand Union
cases, it would not have approved the Commission's utilization of section 5
for that purpose.
The final chapter of the book is devoted to an evaluation of the history
of enforcement of the act by the FTC, the agency chiefly responsible for its
administration. A devastating statistical analysis shows that in the twenty-
five years of enforcement, fifty-six per cent of the Commission complaints
(and sixty-three per cent of the orders secured) have been under the least
significant provisions of the act, such as section 2(c) (brokerage) and
section 2(d) (advertising allowances). (p. 535 et seq.) (Section 2(c), both
in its conception and Commission enforcement, receives the author's severest
castigation as class legislation of an obvious sort having the design and
effect of insulating one part of the business community (principally, food
brokers) from possible competition from more efficient and flexible means of
distribution.)
The statistics reveal that the large buyers, against which the Robinson-
Patman Act was most explicitly directed have been spared virtually any
cause for concern: only 3.6 per cent of all complaints in the period have been
directed against buyers. Perhaps most striking of all is the revelation of the
ironical fact that, although the act was originally designed to help the "little
businessman," the bulk of the enforcement activity and others secured have
been directed against the relatively small concern. (p. 542.) Accentuating this
lopsided enforcement record has been the tendency of the Commission, in
a given case, when confronted with two possible interpretations of a pro-
vision of the act, to choose the one most restrictive of competition. (p. 543.) 14
Although calling for a correction of this past history by a change of
focus of Commission enforcement activity, Mr. Rowe, nevertheless, offers no
concrete program for adoption by the Commission. His only suggestion (that
large buyer cases receive greater emphasis in the future), while generally
sound, offers no sure answer to the Commission's problem of rationalizing
the act with the other antitrust laws." Undue restriction of buyer activity
may well thwart that "sturdy bargaining between buyer and seller" which
13 Oppenheim, Harmonization of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 17 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 231 et seq. (1960).
14 Cf. Hally, The Meeting Competition Defense in Robinson-Patman: FTC v. The
Courts, 3 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 201 (1962).
15 FTC v. Motion Pictures Advertising Co., 344 U.S. 392, 406 (1952).
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the Commission has been enjoined to leave play for.le To forestall any such
result, the economic and marketing situation presented in a given case must
be carefully analyzed and there must be insistence among other things, on
according a liberal scope to the meeting competition defense and adequate
proof of the requisite injury to competition (not merely individual com-
petitors) .
Possibly the only answer that can be given is for the Commission and,
to a greater extent, the courts, to act, during the next quarter-century,
with a greater consciousness of the fact that undiscriminating application of
the provisions of this act may restrain more competition than it fosters.
JOHN R. HALLY
Member of Massachusets Bar,
Partner in the firm of Nutter,
McClennen & Fish, Boston.
10 Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 344 U.S. 809 (1952). [And see Commission itself
to the same effect.] Accord, Union Carbide Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 15503 (Dkt.
6826 Sept. 25, 1961) (Clayton Act § 7) ; Snap-On Tools Corp., 3 Id. 11 15,546 (Dkt. '7116
Nov. 1, 1961) (F.T.C. Act § 5).
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